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BRUCE YANDLE*

Comments on Land Trusts and the
Choice to Conserve Land with Full
Ownership or Conservation Easements
I. INTRODUCTION
Nick Parker's examination of land trust decision making is of
great interest to environmentalists, social scientists, and policy makers.
His article is of particular interest to those who seek a better
understanding of how private property rights affect and are affected by
the growing land trust phenomenon. But rather than focus on their
phenomenal growth and why there are land trusts, Parker seeks to get
inside the box of the land trust, the not-for-profit firm itself, and explain
the logic of choice that is applied when those organizations have the
opportunity to receive ownership of particular land rights. Will the trust
decide to hold conservation easements for the rights in question or will
the trust seek the full bundle of land rights-fee simple? This is the
motivating question for the article.
To answer it, Parker focuses on transaction costs faced by a land
trust when managing land rights and how these costs differ between
easements and fee simple ownership. The model considers positive and
negative rights that may be associated with conservation and nonconservation activities. Parker's model envisions the land trust
management weighing the relative gains from one form of right transfer
versus another and opting for easements or fee simple transfers
depending on how the mix of rights at the margin maximizes the value
of land rights in its portfolio after all transaction costs are covered. The
model focuses on the land trust as prime mover.1 The land trust seeks to
maximize land values, while land rights donors, presumably, seek to
maximize the present value of their wealth.
Parker's focus on transaction costs enables him to derive a rich
set of refutable hypotheses about the kinds of land rights or land
activities that are more likely to be managed with an easement rather
than fee-simple ownership. In a strong and very creative empirical
section, Parker submits his hypotheses to a series of tests and finds
meaningful support for the underlying forecast of the model.
* PERC Senior Associate.
1. The prime mover is the initiator of action in a two-party setting. It is possible for
either the landowner or the land trust to take the initiative in contracting one with the
other.
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Parker has produced an interesting, well written, and carefully
constructed paper. Of the various parts, I find the empirical section to be
the strongest and most interesting. Indeed, I believe the empirical section
can be used with an alternate model that may escape some of the
complexities associated with the current one.
In the remaining parts of my comment, I discuss some of my
concerns with the Parker model. I then describe an alternate view of
land-rights allocation to land trusts and explain how the alternate model,
which has weaknesses of its own, contains a bit more behavioral content
and is consistent with the same set of refutable hypotheses provided by
Parker's model.
II. AREAS OF CONCERN WITH THE PARKER MODEL
The Parker model is a transaction cost model that focuses on
particular inputs. The focus on inputs raises a number of concerns. The
first has to do with the inputs-negative and positive rights. It seems to
me that since all private property rights are exclusive, what is positive to
one party is by definition negative to another. The right to farm
agricultural land is simultaneously the right to exclude hunting, the
production of timber, homebuilding, changing oil in BMW automobiles,
and an endless list of other activities. The holder of the rights determines
the opportunities foregone. An easement that transfers development
rights from agricultural land to a land trust is positive to the trust but
negative to the land owner and to all others who may have designs on
the property.
If we assume there are a finite number of identifiable sticks in a
specific property rights bundle, let us say 100, then there are certain
negative and positive rights associated with each stick. While the sticks
can be counted, the number of negative rights cannot be, since they are
part of an infinity of actions that can be excluded. In other words, when
negative and positive rights are summed, it is possible to get more than
100. Indeed, I believe the number would form an infinity of rights.
A. Conservation and Non-conservation Activities
Parker's notion of conservation and non-conservation activities
raises a second problem-what is conservation in one setting may be
non-conservation in another. In raising this concern, I hasten to add that
I can offer no immediate remedy for it.
For example, tomato farmers in Charleston County, South
Carolina, today are viewed as producing an environmental value for
those who drive by the moss-draped oaks that border the farmland and
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view with misplaced nostalgia the happy tomato pickers who come at
harvest time, most likely from Mexico. The county has issued bonds for
the purpose of buying the development rights and placing them in a
trust. In Charleston then, farming is a conservation activity. Meanwhile,
the owners of farmland hold the cash value of the development rights
that are transferred away and continue to engage in agricultural
production.
Similarly, the state of Wisconsin pays farmers to maintain their
barns, which are seen as an important part of the state's scenic beauty.
Vegetable farms in Charleston and dairy farms in Wisconsin, which
some would see from a distance as non-conservation activity, are seen on
closer inspection as conservation, at least by the voters in those
communities. Elsewhere, of course, agricultural activity is seen as
destructive to certain features of nature. In those cases, easements or
agriculture production rights are transferred to a land trust for the
purpose of reducing production agriculture and therefore enhancing the
environment. While we can most likely resolve this definitional problem
about what is conservation and non-conservation when a particular
parcel of land is being considered, I do not think we can resolve it
globally when data are aggregated across the United States. In other
words, what seems otherwise to be a sound behavioral model may break
down when applied to an aggregated data set.
B. Who Is the Residual Claimant?
An occasional appeal to incentives associated with residuals and
who gets them raises another set of issues for the land trust side of
Parker's model. If we focus solely on private landowner decisions, then
appeal to the residual claimant makes sense. Private owners of land and
their heirs are the residual claimants; we predict a tendency to conserve
because of this.
Trustees of land trusts, if other than the landowners, are another
matter. They and their heirs have no individual claims to the residuals of
land trust operations. It is to be granted that by self-selection the ultimate
trustees may be people who receive utility 2 from an expanding trust
operation and may receive particular joy from being able to manage
excess revenues that arise from cost-effective management. But unlike
landowners who may be negotiating with the trustees, the trustees have
no claim on the assets that can be converted to cash or other real benefits
when they vacate their trusteeship.
2.

Utility and happiness or satisfaction are synonyms.
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The problem here is the assumption that underlies the term
"residual claimant." It is not a problem with respect to economizing
behavior that may be exhibited by trustees of not-for-profit
organizations. If the use of the term is crucial, then I suggest that the
focus should be on landowners and that the land trust should play a
passive role in the decision-making process. Instead of doing this,
however, I recommend a change in vocabulary. Let the trustees be
output maximizers, cost minimizers, or better yet utility maximizers.
These terms more accurately describe the trustee's role.
C. Differentiating Trusts from Farms
Parker helpfully differentiates land trusts from farms by
suggesting that farm operators have a comparative cost advantage in
farming, relative to trusts, and that land trusts have a comparative cost
advantage in managing land rights. It follows that land trusts would not
be able to compete as farm operators.
While this ex post analysis in fact may be true, it is more likely a
result of legal constraints than the failure of markets to allocate
specialized resources to firms, irrespective of their names. As not-forprofit firms, land trusts have specialized charters that allow them to
engage in specified land management activities. They are not legally able
to engage in production agriculture as for-profit firms. In that sense, they
cannot be competitive farmers. Land trusts have a legal duty to engage
in specialized land rights management-farmers do not.
With all this said, there is no economic reason that a farm
operator could not organize a land trust and participate as its executive
director or trustee. On the other hand, all private parties who assemble
land for conservation purposes are in fact acting like land trusts. But as a
land trust trustee, a farm proprietor could channel resources in the
direction of land trust activities. It is also true that the executive director
and trustees of a land trust could, if they wished, organize a for-profit
farm and operate it as a separate and distinct economic activity. It must
be the case that many trust managers do in fact engage in farming and
ranching activities. But it is the prior constraint of law that yields the
specialization found in the black box called land trust, not economic
specialization.
D. The Strength of the Parker Model
Despite the concerns raised here, the Parker model does what
models are supposed to do; it provides a useful way to think about the
ultimate land trust rights allocation. Will it be fee-simple transfer or a
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transfer of limited easement rights? As it turns out, most of the business
about positive rights, negative rights, and residual claimants has little
bearing on the final logic of the model. Making common sense
arguments, which are always the most powerful, Parker describes what
land trusts can do at lower cost than landowners, and what landowners
might do at lower cost than land trust personnel. Refutable hypotheses
derived from his common sense arguments are tested, and the results are
indeed supportive of the model's implications.
III. AN ALTERNATE MODEL
I want to suggest and partly develop an alternate model that
may comfortably amend the model Parker has employed. In my model,
the landowner is the prime mover, not the land trust. The landowner is a
utility maximizer. He gains happiness from two activities. One is the
production of noncommercial environmental services enjoyed by the
landowner, members of his family, and others in his community. In the
absence of any contract-based encouragements, the landowner produces
some positive amount of environmental services. We might say that he
holds to some stewardship ethic. In more prosaic terms, we can say the
landowner loves flowers and particular vistas that he maintains on his
land. So do some of his neighbors, whose well-spoken opinions the
landowner values.
Importantly, the environmental services that the landowner
3
produces have a peculiar trait that is referred to as publicness. A unit of
environmental beauty produced by and for Farmer Jones becomes a
partial unit available for others in the community. Put differently, a wellmaintained vista made available to one carload of passers-by is a vista
for busloads of passers-by. Unlike private goods, which provide
consumption benefits to one party and disappear when consumed, a unit
of a public good, one with the publicness trait, when made available for
one person is simultaneously a unit for many. As some might say, the
good is nondepletable and nonexcludable. In a community of landowners who value the sight of well-maintained land and vistas, each
landowner produces happiness for his neighbors when making himself
happy.

3.

JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 65 (1968).
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A. Meeting the Publicness Challenge
Because of the publicness of environmental services, the landowner's effort to produce environmental services may include
participation in a local conservation organization, such as a land trust.
The trust, one of many available to the landowner, encourages
conservation activities and accepts donations of easements and fee
simple land rights. However, in the absence of any other benefits, these
activities are not the crucial ones for landowners who seek to maintain
an optimal level of conservation activities.
Coordination of land conservation activities across multiple
landowners is required to achieve a collective optimal outcome. One
might argue that the degree of participation is conditioned by population
density of landowners who seek to produce environmental services. If
average land holdings are large, making landowners few and far
between, then the publicness of their environmental production and the
related need to coordinate will disappear. However, if people far
removed from the site of the amenities are willing to pay for additional
production, then there is evidence that publicness can travel great
distances. The land trust serves as a beneficial cartel for coordinating
production of a valuable public good. With coordination in place, the
conservation organization can also accept fee simple transfers of land
rights and easements that memorialize aspects of the coordination effort.
B. After-Tax Income: The Other Driver
Net after-tax income, or all other goods, is the other argument in
the landowner's utility function.4 Landowner income is derived from
commercial use of land. The landowner's utility is constrained by the
amount of land rights he owns or controls. There is a transformation
function that describes how land that produces noncommercial
environmental services can be converted by the landowner to
commercial production. The division of land as between conservation
and non-conservation activities is determined by the utility obtained
from income relative to the utility gained from conservation activities.
The transformation function includes real management and other
transaction costs associated with the two utility-generating activities as
well as any special tax treatment accorded expansion of one or the other
land use activities.
4. Economy theory explains human action on the basis of a collection of goods and
experiences that generate utility or happiness for the individual. This unique collection of
goods and experiences can be expressed as a mathematical function or utility function.
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C. Regulatory Disturbances and Incentives
Assume that this representative landowner obtains equilibrium
with respect to his two utility-generating activities. He is as happy as he
can be given the constraints he faces. There is a positive amount of land
committed to producing environmental services. The balance of the land
produces commercial products and income.
Now, a new constraint arises -the government defines a portion
of the commercial land as wetlands (or other sensitive habitat), impairing
the output of commercial products as well as income to the landowner.
In essence, the government requires the landowner to produce more
environmental services than he would choose to produce voluntarily.
The landowner is now in a disequilibrium position. A new regulatory
equilibrium will obtain if penalties and other sanctions are introduced
that affect the landowner's transformation function. However, happily,
the regulatory regime that affects landowner activities is accompanied
by special tax incentives that make the regulation more palatable. If land
rights to sensitive land are donated to an approved conservation
organization, the landowner can deduct the market value of the donation
from his tax liability. With such benefits in the offing, interested
landowners make haste to enlarge the activities of their favored land
trust.
D. Land Trusts Enter the Picture
Let us now recall the land trusts that may passively accept
planned donations of land rights from landowners. It is to be
remembered that the land trusts operate in a competitive market, which
tends to minimize the cost of providing land trust services. The
combination of regulatory and tax incentives generates new interest in
land trust activities on the part of landowners. As trustees of the land
trust, the community of landowners must determine how land rights can
be transferred to the trust in ways consistent with the landowner utility
maximizing goals.
Recall that each landowner faces a land-based constraint that
describes how land can be converted from commercial to noncommercial
production. Management costs, other transaction costs, and special tax
benefits are included in the transformation function. If a commercial
landowner transfers easements instead of fee simple ownership to the
trust, it is business as usual for the farmer; the farmer's management
activity is not increased. If, however, fee simple ownership is transferred
to the trust, a new transaction cost enters the story. Unless the trust
received a guarantee that the farmer will continue his land management
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activities, the trust will have to pay someone to assume those activities.
Total land management costs must increase with each fee simple
transfer. The landowner is still managing land and now the land trust
must manage related land rights. Even if there are economies of scale in
monitoring and managing, there will be a new element of cost that did
not exist before. Therefore, representative landowner/trustees will only
transfer fee simple when the land in question is to be converted to
specialized activities that require specialized monitoring and
management. With due consideration given to costs and benefits, land
rights are transferred to land trusts in ways that maximize landowner
utility.
At this point, all of Parker's propositions seem to emerge from
the model. Indeed, his story is in ways the mirror image of mine. His
resulting empirical work illuminates the working of the model. There is,
then, more than one way of getting to the strong empirical part of the
Parker article.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
The Parker model and the alternative sketched here focus on
decisions regarding what form property rights will take when
landowners transfer rights to land trusts. There are elements in both
models that address the question of why land trust activity has enjoyed
such burgeoning growth in the last few decades. Parker describes the
growth of state and federal tax benefits accorded landowners who
transfer rights to trusts. He also identifies the emergence of model state
legislation that reflects legislative accommodation of land trusts. Given
this governmental encouragement, it is not surprising that land trusts
would become a growing industry.
The publicness of land conservation activities when coupled
with the income sensitivity of demand for environmental quality
augments the encouragement supplied by tax and legislative incentives.
We know that the demand for conservation activities increases
systematically with rising per capita income.5 Then, if my argument
about regulatory constraints and government efforts to ease their bite is
valid, yet another land trust demand shifter enters the picture. When
each of these drivers is examined closely, special tax treatment seems to
be the crucial element. Any modification of tax treatment, increasing or

5.

See generally BRUCE YANDLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL KUzNETS CURVES: A PRIMER

(Prop. & Envtl. Res. Ctr., Pub. No. RS02-01, 2002) (discussing the relationship between
income changes and environmental quality).
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decreasing taxpayer benefits, will directly affect the fortunes and growth
of the land trust movement.
In conclusion, there are two observations to make with regard to
the growth and financial success of land trusts, especially as related to
the larger national trusts. First, there is evidence that suggests that the
larger land trusts serve as land agents for government.6 When a federal
agency seeks to acquire private land rights, land trusts offer the
advantage of being able to move faster and with less public notice and,
therefore, less controversy, in doing the government's bidding. The land
trust can acquire fee simple ownership and in turn sell the property
rights to the federal government, for a profit. This provides yet one more
reason one might observe fee simple land rights in a land trust's
portfolio, albeit on a temporary basis.
But sometimes, government agencies also compete with land
trusts. For example, the federal government's wetland reserve program
provides the means for farmers to sell fee-simple rights and easements as
perpetuities to the federal government, in which case the government
pays 100 percent of fair market value. Alternately, the seller can write a
30-year contract with the government and receive 75 percent of market
value. However, this competition is hampered by all the competitive
disadvantages inherent to a government-operated enterprise.

6. Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Land Trusts: A Return to Feudalism, in
AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SEARCHING FOR GREENER PASTURES 25-45 (Terry L.
Anderson & Bruce Yandle eds., 2001).

